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Abstract
Ina scheduling problem where agents canopt out, we show that the familiar Random
Priority (RP) mechanism can be improved upon by another mechanism dubbed
Probabilistic Serial (PS). Both mechanisms are nonmanipulable in a strong sense,
but the latter is Pareto superior to the former and serves a larger (expected) number
of agents. The PS equilibrium outcome is easier to compute than the RP outcome;
on the other hand RP is easier to implement than PS. We show that the improvement
of PS over RP is signi¯cant but small: at most a couple of percentage points in the
relative welfare gain and the relative di®erence in quantity served. Both gains vanish
when the number of agents is large; hence both mechanisms can be used as a proxy
of each other.
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The paper addresses a simple scheduling problem. There is a batch arrival of agents, each
of whom have a job requiring one unit of time. The planner/manager controls a server
processing one job per unit of time. All agents prefer early service but are heterogeneous
in their `type' |i.e., the number of time periods they can a®ord to wait for service. If
an agent anticipates a wait longer than this limit, he immediately opts out and leaves
the system. The manager uses a non-price mechanism to schedule the agents; the only
information he can use is the type of each agent.
Fix a deterministic priority ordering ¾ (e.g., alphabetical order) of the agents and,
following this ordering, let them successively choose either to stay in line |and be served
at the best non-assigned date| or to opt out. The Priority mechanism (denoted Prio(¾)
throughout the paper) is played in a very simple way: the ¯rst agent in the ordering
who is scheduled to be processed at a time period beyond his type opts out ¯rst. Once
he does so, all later-to-be-processed jobs (agents) improve their scheduled time by one
period. Then the next agent who, based on the improved schedule, is scheduled to be
processed at a time period beyond his type, opts out, and so on. Hence the q-th agent
in line faces a wait of k time periods if k ¡ 1 jobs before him chose to stay in line and
q¡k opted out, and decides to stay or opt out according to his type. Such a deterministic
priority mechanism has good incentive compatibility properties (agents have no interest
to misreport their type) but is unfair.
A simple and natural way to restore fairness is the Random Priority (RP) mechanism:
the planner selects at random and without bias a certain priority ordering ¾ of the agents
(among the n! possible orderings if there are n agents), then priority mechanism Prio(¾)
is played as described in the previous paragraph. A ¯rst contribution of the present
paper is to provide a recursive algorithm computing the outcome of RP, i.e., the expected
assignment of agents to time slots, called the RP equilibrium assignment in the sequel1.
A second contribution of the paper is to propose another scheduling protocol dubbed
Probabilistic Serial (PS). It resembles Random Priority closely, in particular shares its
properties of incentive compatibility (strategyproofness) and fairness. The advantage of
Probabilistic Serial over Random Priority is twofold: (1) from an e±ciency point of view
PS always improves upon RP welfarewise, in the strong sense of the Pareto ranking (no
1Or even in short RP assignment.
2agent is worse o® and some agents are strictly better o® in PS than in RP) and moreover,
it always serves a larger expected number of agents than RP; (2) from a computational
point of view the outcome of PS, i.e., the expected assignment of agents to time slots
(called the PS equilibrium assignment in the sequel), is much easier to compute than that
of RP; moreover the two equilibrium assignments are shown to be close to each other and
even to converge to one another when the number of agents becomes large.
Probabilistic Serial is implemented in the same way as Random Priority: by selecting a
certain priority ordering ¾ of the agents and then playing this priority mechanism Prio(¾).
The only di®erence is that the probability distribution according to which the ordering of
agents is selected is computed by a polynomial algorithm using the agents' reports about
their type, in contrast with RP selecting this ordering from the uniform distribution.
Thirdly, we show that the improvement of PS over RP is signi¯cant but small: if a
gain of a couple of percentage points (in the number of agents served and in the surplus
collected) matters, then the additional e®ort of implementing PS instead of RP is justi¯ed.
Otherwise, we may in e®ect take each mechanism as a proxy of the other; this is especially
true if many agents are involved.
1.2 Overview of the results and related literature
The model is de¯ned in Section 2, and the Random Priority mechanism is analyzed in
Section 3, where we give a recursive algorithm to compute its expected outcome (Propo-
sition 1). The Probabilistic Serial mechanism is de¯ned in Section 4 in a `backward'
fashion: we ¯rst de¯ne its equilibrium outcome (by means of an easy formula), then we
show that it can be implemented by randomly choosing, and playing, a priority mecha-
nism (Proposition 2). Proposition 3 in Section 5 shows that both mechanisms, RP and
PS, share the very strong incentive compatibility property known as `group strategyproof-
ness'. Next, Theorem 1 establishes that the equilibrium outcome of PS is Pareto superior
(or indi®erent) to that of RP. Section 6 gathers some concluding comments.
A convergence result (Theorem 2) is reported in Appendix A: when the number of
agents grows large, the di®erence between the RP and PS assignments vanishes. Extensive
numerical computations are reported in Appendix B. All tedious proofs are gathered in
Appendix C.
We discuss now the literature related to our model. In the mathematical economics
literature, scheduling is a special case of the random assignment problem, where q objects
must be randomly assigned to n agents with heterogeneous preferences over the objects.
3The other related stream of literature bears on scheduling and queuing; a good survey
is Lawler et al. (1993). Both streams of literature discuss incentive compatibility and
fairness, but they give di®erent meanings to these terms.
In the latter, the discussion of incentive compatibility typically relies on tolls (Naor,
1968; Dolan, 1979; Suijs, 1996) or nonlinear prices (Mendelson, 1985; Mendelson and
Whang, 1990) whereas cash transfers of any sort are ruled out in our model. An exception,
where incentive compatibility is by means of randomization, is the work of Shenker (1995),
see also Nagle (1987) and Demers, Keshav and Shenker (1990), focusing on the case where
each agent may demand a di®erent number of jobs. Fairness is also dicussed in that work,
and interpreted , as is common in the queuing literature, as requiring that no job takes
all resource capacity at the expense of other jobs.
In the mathematical economics literature on random assignment, on the other hand,
fairness means, at least, that users with identical demands should be treated equally
(ex ante), and sometimes is interpreted as the stronger requirement of envy-freeness (no
agent prefers {ex ante{ the assignment of another agent to his own). The main ¯nd-
ing is the impossibility of meeting simultaneously fairness, incentive compatibility and
e±ciency: Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Gale (1981), Zhou (1990), Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (1999b). But in the particular context of scheduling with opting out, these three
requirements are compatible, and in fact their combination characterize Probabilistic Se-
rial: Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999a)2, brie°y discussed at the end of Section 6. Finally,
Friedman (1994) assumes that individual preferences are dichotomous (namely °at up
to a certain `deadline') and discusses a mechanism similar to, but di®erent from, our
Probabilistic Serial.
2 The model
The set I of agents is ¯xed throughout, I = f1;2;:::;ng. Each agent i is endowed with
a von Neumann{Morgenstern utility function ui, ui 2 Rn, over the n possible periods or
dates at which he could be served. If agent i receives service at date k, his utility is ui(k):
in this case, we say below that he consumes date k, or that he is assigned date k. We
always assume that preferences are monotonic, namely:
ui(k) ¸ ui(k + 1); for all k = 1;:::;n ¡ 1 : (1)
2Note that these two papers were inspired by the present work.
4Moreover, the zero of the utility function is interpreted as the utility for the outside option.
We say that agent i is of type k if
ui(k) > 0 ¸ ui(k + 1) : (2)
Here k varies from zero (if ui(1) · 0) to n (if ui(n) > 0). The type tells us how long the
agent is willing to wait before exercising his outside option. In the strategic analysis we
assume that, faced with the choice between opting out and consuming the k-th date, he
opts out whenever indi®erent (ui(k) = 0). This altruistic tiebreaking rule will simplify
the strategic analysis without any real loss of generality.
We denote by U the set of utility functions (the subset of Rn de¯ned by (1)) and by Uk,
k = 1;:::;n, the subset of utility functions of type k (de¯ned by (2)). To a pro¯le of utility
functions U 2 Un, we associate a pro¯le of types T = (I0;:::;In) which keeps track of the
type of every agent. Thus (Ik)0·k·n is the partition of I de¯ned by i 2 Ik () ui 2 Uk.
Because our two mechanisms, Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial, use only the
pro¯le of types to compute the (random) assignment of dates to agents, we often omit
the underlying pro¯le of von Neumann{Morgenstern utility functions; however the latter
are key to the strategic and welfare analysis, and the primitive constituents of our model.
We denote by ¢ the set of (random) assignments over the n dates and the outside
option. An element z 2 ¢ is written as a nonnegative n-vector z = (z1;:::;zn) such that
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An I-assignment (zi)1·i·n speci¯es a random assignment to each agent. It will be
convenient to write such an assignment in matrix form, Z = [zik], where the entry zik is
the probability that agent i consumes date k: the row index i runs over I and the column
index k over K = f1;:::;ng.
The planner/manager can choose at random the order in which agents are o®ered
service. Hence Z is feasible if and only if it is a convex combination of deterministic
priority assignments. In order to make this statement precise, we introduce some notation.
Let S denote the set of sequences ¾ = (i1;:::;iq) of q distinct elements in I, for some
q, 0 · q · n (with the convention that the empty sequence corresponds to q = 0). Let
S be the subset of S comprising the sequences of length exactly n: thus S is identi¯ed
with the set of priority orderings of I. To each ¾ 2 S we associate the following truncated
permutation matrix P¾:
P¾ = [zik]; zik = 1 if k = 1;:::;q and i = ik; zik = 0 for all other i;k :
5The matrix P¾ is the deterministic assignment resulting from serving the agents in ¾, in
that order, and ignoring the others.
To each ¾ 2 S we associate the Priority mechanism Prio(¾) : following the ordering
¾ , the agents are successively o®ered the best non-assigned date, and choose either to
stay in line for service or to opt out. If ¾ : (¾(1);:::;¾(n)), agent ¾(q) is o®ered date k
if exactly k ¡ 1 agents among ¾(1);:::;¾(q ¡ 1) accepted the o®er.
Given a pro¯le of types T and a priority ordering ¾ 2 S, we denote by ¾ the (possibly
shorter) sequence in S of the agents successively served in equilibrium, when the priority
ordering is ¾. That is, an agent of type k accepts any date not later than k and refuses
any later date. We call ¾ the equilibrium sequence associated with the ordering ¾. For
instance consider (I0;I1;I3;I4) = (f4g;f1;3g;f5g;f2;6g), then
¾ = (3;2;5;4;1;6) =) ¾ = (3;2;6) ;
¾ = (4;6;1;3;5;2) =) ¾ = (6;5;2) :
Given the pro¯le T and an ordering ¾ 2 S, we denote by Prio(¾;T) = P¾ the
truncated permutation matrix resulting from the corresponding equilibrium sequence.
De¯nition 1 An assignment matrix Z is feasible at the pro¯le of types T if and only if Z
is a convex combination of the matrices Prio(¾;T), ¾ 2 S. We let F be the set of feasible
assignment matrices.
Remark: Clearly, and assignment matrix Z 2 F is substochastic:
zik ¸ 0 for all i;k ;
X
i2I
zik · 1 and
n X
k=1
zik · 1 for all i;k : (3)
This follows straightforwardly from the fact that each matrix P¾ is substochastic. Con-
versely, these inequalities are not su±cient to characterize F. Baiou and Balinski (1998),
Theorem 4, o®er a conjecture about a characterization of the related set of convex com-
binations of the matrices P¾, ¾ 2 S (independently of agents' types).
3 The RP mechanism and equilibrium assignment
As mentioned in the introduction, the description of the RP mechanism is very simple,
but that of its equilibrium assignment is not.
6De¯nition 2 The Random Priority mechanism selects at random and without bias a
priority ordering of I, namely and element ¾ in S. Then the agents play the priority












Ik denote the set of agents of type at least q. As long as the RP
mechanism is assigning the dates 1 to q, all agents in Mq behave in exactly the same
way. Consider then the assignment of date q. The probability that an agent in InMq
consumes it is zero, whereas all agents in Mq have an equal probability to consume it.
Denoting mq the cardinality of Mq, the latter probability equals ¯q=mq where ¯q is the
probability that date q is assigned at all. Therefore the RP assignment at T is ZRP = [zik]




if i 2 Mk
= 0 if i = 2 Mk
(4)
Computing the RP assignment boils down to computing the sequence (¯k)k¸1. It is useful
to introduce the `threshold' quantity4 qe associated with a pro¯le of types T:
qe is the largest quantity q such that q · mq : (5)
Observation 1 ¯q = 1 whenever q · qe. Conversely, whenever q > qe, we have ¯q < 1 .
Moreover the sequence (¯q)q¸1 is nonincreasing.
Proof: For the ¯rst assertion, after the ¯rst q ¡ 1 dates are assigned, some agents in Mq
are still not served (because q · qe =) mq > q ¡ 1), hence the claim by induction.
The second assertion is because with positive probability the ¯rst mq agents drawn by
RP are precisely those in Mq; they all accept to consume date k with k · q ¡ 1; since
3The concept of strategic equilibrium used here is that of a dominant strategy; for an agent of type
q, it is a dominant strategy to accept any date k, k · q, and refuse any other one. Alternatively, we
may describe our equilibrium as the unique strong equilibrium of the game. We omit the unimportant
details, and refer the interested reader to Crµ es and Moulin (1999), where the strategic discussion is more
detailed.
4In the slightly di®erent context of Crµ es and Moulin (1999), it is the `e±cient' quantity, in the economic
meaning of the word; it is also the quantity for which the type curve crosses the diagonal.
7q > qe =) mq · q ¡ 1, all agents in Mq are served in this case before date q is o®ered
and there is no one left to consume that date.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a simple formula for ¯q. Our ¯rst result provides
a recursive algorithm.
Proposition 1 Given a pro¯le of types T = (I0;:::;In) with corresponding cardinalities
(n0;:::;nn) we denote by Q the largest integer q such that Iq is nonempty, and assume





aQ;r for all q;1 · q · Q; ¯q = 0 if q > Q (6)
where the double sequence (aq;r)0·q;r·Q is computed by the initial conditions:
a0;0 = 1; a0;r = 0 for 1 · r · Q ;
and the recursive formulas:















2. if r > mq+1,
aq;r = aq¡1;r¡1+nq : (8)
Proof: See Appendix C.The formulas are not intuitive. The quantity aq;r is the probability
that among the q ¯rst periods, q ¡ r of them are assigned to agents of type 1 to q, and r
or less to agents of type q + 1 to Q. (Note that the set of type 0 agents plays no role in
the computations.)
The main interest of the proposition is to allow numerical computations and to prove
the convergence result in Appendix A. We give several examples in the next section and
Appendix B.
84 The PS mechanism and equilibrium assignment
As mentioned in the introduction, the description of the PS equilibrium assignment is very
simple, but that of the mechanism to implement it requires to run a polynomial algorithm.
An intuitive de¯nition of the PS assignment is by the following algorithm: think of each
date as a mass one probability; allocate the dates sequentially starting from the best
dates with equal share to all interested agents. Therefore agent i of type q (i 2 Iq) gets a
1=mk probabilistic share on date k for k = 1;:::;q. He will accumulate the probabilistic
shares of all the dates, starting from the best one, until one of two things happen: he has
accumulated a probability one of service; or he has accumulated the shares of all dates he
prefers to opting out (i.e., dates 1, 2, ... , k if he is of type k). Formally, for all q ¸ 1; for
all i 2 Iq: 8
> > > > > > > > > <
































The key to the above formula is the critical integer, if any, at which the sum
P
1=mh





· 1 . With
the convention 1=0 = 1, we see that q¤ cannot exceed Q (the largest q such that Iq is





, so that 0 · ² < 1.




°q = 1 for 1 · q · q¤ ;
°q¤+1 = ² ¢ mq¤+1
°q = 0 for q¤ + 2 · q · n :
Interpret °q as the probability that, in the PS assignment, the q-th date be assigned 5.




if i 2 Mk
= 0 if i = 2 Mk
(9)
5Note that the last part of the formula disapears if q¤ = n.
9Given the similar formula (4) de¯ning the assignment ZRP, comparing the two assign-
ments amounts to comparing the vectors (¯q) and (°q), namely the probabilities that the
q-th date be assigned by the two mechanisms.
For q not larger than the threshold quantity qe (see (5)), the q-th date is consumed
for sure in both assignments: ¯q = °q = 1. This was shown for ¯q in Observation 1. As
for °q, it results from qe · q¤, which itself follows from the implication:
½
















Beyond qe, the probabilities ¯q and °q may or may not coincide, as demonstrated by two
examples illustrating De¯nitions 2 and 3. In the examples, we describe the pro¯le simply
by listing the cardinality n1;:::;nQ of the subsets I1;:::;IQ.
Example 1: (n1;n2;n3) = (1;2;2)
We have ¯ve agents, and the threshold quantity is qe = 2 (because m2 = 4 and m3 = 2).




Turning to PS, here q¤ = 3 (because 1=5 + 1=4 + 1=2 < 1), therefore °1 = °2 = °3 = 1.
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Example 2: (n1;n2;n3;n4) = (1;1;1;1)
There are four agents, and qe = 2 (because m2 = 3 and m3 = 2). The probability that






: As for PS, q¤ = 2
(because 1=4 + 1=3 · 1 < 1=4 + 1=3 + 1=2), and °1 = °2 = 1, °3 =
5
6
and °4 = 0. Hence




4; (2) or the ¯rst and third agents in line are those in I3, and the second the one in I1





3. Hence a total of 2
15.
7For instance, the fourth date is assigned only if the priority ordering is by increasing type: proba 1
24.
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Table 1 in Appendix B provides ten more pro¯les, where the number of agents goes
up to 36, for which the vectors (¯q) and (°q) are explicitely computed.
We turn to the de¯nition of the PS mechanism: this amounts to describe PS as a
convex combination of deterministic priority assignments (see De¯nition 1). Given a
pro¯le of types and the corresponding PS assignment ZPS, we must show the existence
of a probability distribution ¼ over S such that, when an order ¾ is drawn in S according






¼¾ ¢ P¾ : (10)
Proposition 2 Given a pro¯le of types T = (I0;:::;In) there exists a probability distri-
bution ¼ over S (computed by a polynomial algorithm) such that (10) holds. (Moreover
each sequence ¾ is of length q¤ or q¤ + 1.)
Proof: See Appendix C. The proof is very similar to the standard problem of representing
a bistochastic matrix as a convex combination of permutation matrices (Birkho®-von
Neumann theorem8). In fact our proof consists simply of providing a bistochastic `cover'
of the PS matrix, and then invoking the Birkho®-von Neumann theorem.
For Example 1, a probability distribution ¼ satisfying Proposition 2 obtains as follows:
(1) draw the ¯rst agent in line (among the ¯ve agents) with uniform probability; (2a) if
the type 1 agent is drawn ¯rst, go on as in RP; (2b) if a type 2 agent is drawn ¯rst, draw
both type 3 agents (in random order, with equal chance on both orders); (2c) if a type 3
agent is drawn ¯rst, draw one type 2 agent (with equal proba on both agents), then draw
the other type 3 agent.
8Well-known to be solvable in polynomial time; a polynomial algorithm for turning any feasible solution
to a linear program into a convex combination of the extreme points of the feasible region may be found
in Bazaraa et al. (1990).
11For example 2, we can choose ¼ as indicated below, where we write the (unique) agent
of type i as i and omit all agents who decline (i.e., we report ¾ instead of ¾):
priority ordering probability
1 3 4 1=8
1 4 3 1=8
2 3 4 1=8
2 4 3 1=8
priority ordering probability
3 2 4 1=6
4 2 3 1=6
3 4 1=12
4 3 1=12
With respect to implementation, the main di®erence between RP and PS is that the
former uses the uniform distribution over all priority orderings, whereas the latter chooses
a distribution only after eliciting the type of every agent. Thus the PS mechanism requires
to process more information than RP, and to compute a polynomial algorithm. We ask
now if the PS mechanism could be open to strategic manipulation: what if an agent ¯nds
it pro¯table to misreport his type? Fortunately, such manipulations do not pose any more
problem to the PS mechanism than they do to the RP mechanism as we shall see in the
next section.
5 Incentive compatibility and welfare comparison
5.1 Incentive compatibility properties
To each pro¯le of types T = (I0;:::;In), the RP mechanism and the PS mechanism
associate a (probabilistic) assignment Z 2 F (given respectively by (4) and (9)). This
de¯nes two mechanisms: T ! Z and we now show that they both are strategyproof: it is
never pro¯table for any agent to misreport his type in the hope of receiving an assignment
improving his utility.
In fact, we show a stronger property: these mechanisms are both group strategyproof,
namely a joint deviation by any coalition of agents either leaves the utilities of all agents in
the coalition unchanged, or strictly decreases the utility of at least one of them. The group
strategyproofness property is one of the strongest incentive compatibility requirements:
its well known informational and normative implications are discussed, e.g., by Barbera
(1995), Moulin (1996).
To formally de¯ne the property `group strategyproofness', we ¯x a mechanism f.
Consider an arbitrary nonempty subset J of I and two pro¯les Ut;t = 0 or 1, in UI that
may di®er along the J-coordinates: for all i 2 InJ : u0
i = u1
i. We denote by T t the pro¯le
12of types corresponding the the utility pro¯le Ut and by zt the assignment resulting from
f. The GSP property requires the following:

















Proposition 3 The RP assignment and the PS assignment both de¯ne a group strate-
gyproof mechanism.
Proof: See Appendix C.
This result states the incentive compatibility of our two mechanism, viewed as `revelation
mechanisms': that is, the manager asks each agent to report his type and enforces the
equilibrium assignment at the reported pro¯le.
5.2 Welfare comparison of the RP and PS mechanisms
With two or three agents, the RP and PS assignments coincide. This fact is easily checked
from De¯nition 3 and by computing directly the RP assignment. For problems involving
four agents or more, these assignments may be di®erent as illustrated by Examples 1
and 2 in the previous section. Note ¯rst that the expected number of agents served is
higher in the PS assignment: in the ¯rst example,
P
q ¯q = 2:87 <
P
q °q = 3; in
the second,
P
q ¯q = 2:79 <
P
q °q = 2:83 . Moreover, in Example 1, an agent
in I3 strictly prefers his PS assignment to his RP assignment (because he gets a higher
proba of consuming period 3, ceteris paribus); on the other hand, agents in I1 and I2
are indi®erent between RP and PS. The situation is similar in Example 2: the ¯rst two
agents are indi®erent whereas the last two strictly prefer PS to RP (e.g., the proba that
the type 4 agent consumes date 4 in RP is `transfered' in PS to his consumption of date
3 |as 3/8+1/24=5/12). These observations generalize.
Theorem 1 Given is a pro¯le of types T = (I0;:::;In) with threshold quantity qe.
1. For every agent, the probability that he be served at all (that he does not opt out) is
not smaller in the PS than in the RP assignment.




PS · 2qe : (12)
9We note than the upper bound on qPS in statement 2 above is tight. That is, for any q, there exists
a pro¯le of types where q is the threshold quantity and qRP = qPS is arbitrarily close to 2qe (see proof).
133. The PS assignment is Pareto superior to the RP assignment, or they are welfare
equivalent:
for all i 2 I; ui ¢ z
PS
i ¸ ui ¢ z
RP
i :
4. Every agent of type at most qe gets the same assignment in RP and PS:





5. Assume q¤ ¸ qe + 1. Then an agent of type at least qe + 1 with strictly monotonic
preferences, strictly prefers his PS assignment to his RP assignment.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the unambiguous welfare advantage of the PS mechanism over
the RP one (statement 3). Moreover, it says that the agents with high types strictly prefer
PS to RP, whereas the agents with low types are indi®erent (statements 4 and 5). Finally,
we learn that PS (in expectation) serves any agent more often (statement 1), but does
not serve more than twice the `e±cient' (in the economic meaning of the word) number
of agents (statement 2).
The literature on scheduling and queuing regards statement 1 as an argument in favor
of PS: it means that its failure rate is smaller (Mendelsson and Wang (1990), Gelenbe and
Mitrani (1980), Lawler et al. (1993)). However, in another interpretation of our model
inspired by the tragedy of the commons (the joint exploitation of a decreasing returns
technology), one important normative goal is to reduce the level of production (see Crµ es
and Moulin (1999) and references therein); in that context, statements 1 and 2 argue in
favor of RP over PS.
In Appendix B, we explain numerically the gap between RP and PS (quantitywise and
welfarewise) and we show it is small (we conjecture in never exceeds 8.33 % quantitywise,
and is usually a couple of percentage points on both dimensions). On top of that we
establish in Appendix A a result of asymptotic equivalence of the two mechanisms when
the number of agents, n, tends toward 1.
6 Concluding comments
1. An important feature of our two mechanims RP and PS is that they only use
the ordinal information on types in the computation of the ¯nal outcome. This
14makes for very simple mechanisms and allows the very strong incentive compatibility
property described in Proposition 3; on the other hand, it rules out the possibility to
take advantage of cardinal information. For instance, if an agent has dichotomous
preferences such as ui(k) = 1 for k = 1;2;3;4 and ui(k) = ¡1 otherwise, it is
ine±cient to serve him with positive probability in date 1 if there is at least one
other agent with strictly monotonic preferences. Yet the RP and PS mechanisms
cannot use such information.
2. A more general perspective on our model comes from the mechanism design ap-
proach. A general mechanism elicits from the agents the pro¯le of utility functions
U, then determines the random assignment Z under the feasibility constraint de-
scribed in De¯nition 1. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999a) apply this viewpoint to
our model, and restrict attention to the class of random assignment mechanisms that
only elicit such ordinal information. They o®er a concept of e±ciency adapted to
this informational structure (called `ordinal e±ciency') and they characterize PS by
the combination of its properties of e±ciency, fairness, and incentive compatibility.
More precisely, they show that:
(a) PS is the only such mechanism that satisfy the combination of (i) ordinal
e±ciency, (ii) strategyproofness and (iii) equal treatment of equals (two agents
sending identical reports receive the same random assignment);
(b) it is also the only such assignment that satisfy the combination of (i) ordinal
e±ciency and (ii) envy-freeness (no agent prefers the random assignment of
another agent to his own).
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Appendix A: Asymptotic equivalence between the RP and PS mechanisms
Denote L the set of probability measures over the unit interval [0;1]. An element ¸ 2 L generates a
distribution function ± of agents across types:
8x 2 [0;1] ; ±(x) = ¸([x;1]) :
To avoid unnecessary technical di±culties, we assume that ¸ is measurable (absolutely continuous) with
respect to the Lebesgue measure and that its density is nonzero in the neighborhood of 1. In particular
± is continuous, nonincreasing and ±(0) = 1; ±(1) = 0:
We ¯x the measure ¸ throughout this appendix. Denote a pro¯le of types as T = (n0;:::;nQ) where




nQ > 0. To avoid `empty economies', we assume Q ¸ 1. For any pair (n;Q) 2 N2
+, one can de¯ne a






















where bxc denotes the highest integer smaller than or equal to x. For instance, take ¸ ´ 1, the uniform
density over [0;1]. It generates the distribution function ±(x) = 1 ¡ x. For n = (Q + 1)k;k 2 N, the
uniform pro¯le of types T = (k;:::;k) obtains.
17Notice however that our measurability assumption on ¸ prevents us from describing `atomic' pro¯les
of types where a positive fraction of agents have the same type for any n and any Q. For instance, there
is no function ± such that eqs. (13) yield an homogeneous pro¯le T(n;Q) for all n;Q.














; for all q;q · Q :











Theorem 2 below describes the asymptotic behavior of the RP and PS assignments, for any sequence
(n;Q) where n grows in¯nitely and where the crowding factor c = n=Q converges, possibly to in¯nity.
The key fact is that these two assignments coincide in the limit. In order to give a precise statement of
this property, we establish some preliminary results.
First we compute the limit ratio between the threshold quantity q
(n;Q)
e and Q, in terms of the two
parameters of the model |the distribution function ± and the (limit) crowding factor c, 1 · c · 1. We
claim that for any sequence (n;Q) such that n ¡! 1 and n=Q ¡! c, the ratio q
(n;Q)
e =Q converges; its










= c < 1; then xe is de¯ned by c±(xe) = xe :
(14)
The proof is in Appendix C.
In the case c = 1, Property (14) says that the threshold quantity q
(n;Q)
e is (almost) equal to Q when
n is large. Since we know that the PS and RP assignments coincide for all agents of type at most qe, this
establishes their asymptotic equivalence at once (see Theorem 2 for a precise statement).
We turn to the case of a sequence (n;Q) for which the limit crowding factor is ¯nite.



















































10In the following expression m stands for m(n;Q) as de¯ned by eqs. (13): we drop the superscript,
here and below, to lighten the notation.















































































delivers an upper bound converging to the same limit.
We can now describe the asymptotic behavior of the integer q¤(n;Q) around which the PS assignment



















< +1 then two subcases occur:

















< +1 then x¤ = 1.














Theorem 2 Given a probability distribution ¸ with cumulative ±, and a number c, 1 · c · 1, we de¯ne
x¤ as follows: 8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :













Consider a sequence (n;Q) such that n ! 1 and limn!1
n
Q
























x < x¤ =) limn!1 ¯
(n;Q)
q = limn!1 °
(n;Q)
q = 1 ;
x > x¤ =) limn!1 ¯
(n;Q)




Proof: Available from the authors and online.




















0 for x > x¤
[0;1] for x = x¤
1 for x < x¤
:
Appendix B: Numerical computations
Proposition 1 gives a recursive algorithm for computing the probabilities ¯q, and De¯nition 3 gives a
(much simpler) algorithm for computing °q. In the ten representative examples reported in Table 1, we






£ 100, i.e., the di®erence in
expected number of agents served, relative to the threshold number, in percentage. The examples are
ordered according to their crowding factor c = n=Q:








(1 1 0:83 0:17 0 0 0 0)
(1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0)
0%
(1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1;1) 1
(1 1 1 1 1 1 0:98 0:69 0:17 0:01 0 0)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:9 0 0 0 0)
0:8%
(0;2;0;2;0;2;0;2;0;2;0;2) 1
(1 1 1 1 1 1 0:99 0:84 0:28 0:03 0 0)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:2 0 0 0)
1:0%
(0;0;0;0;0;10;0;2) 1:5
(1 1 1 1 1 1 0:77 0:23)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0)
0%
(2;2;2;2;2;2;2;2;2;2;2;2) 2
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:96 0:61 0:1)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:79 0)
0:5%
(6;0;0;0;0;6;6;0;0;0;0;6) 2
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:98 0:87 0:54 0:18)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:58 0)
0:1%
(0;0;2;0;4;4;6;2) 2:25
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:77)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1)
3:1%
(6;5;4;3;2;1;1;1;1) 2:67
(1 1 1 1 1 0:99 0:7 0:13 0)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 0:89 0 0)
1:2%
(3;3;3;3;3;3;3;3;3;3;3;3) 3
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:99 0:67)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:9)
2:7%
(8;7;6;5;4;3;2;1) 4:5
(1 1 1 1 1 1 0:94 0:24)
(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0:22)
0:7%
Table 1
Table 2 reports the maximal values of ¢q=qe when the type of each agent is at most 8 and the number
n of agents varies between 4 and 25 (all bounds imposed for computational tractability). For each value
of n, we report also one maximizing pro¯le.



















21The constraint q · 8 appears to be nonbinding, suggesting that the above values are the absolute
maxima of ¢q=qe for any pro¯le with the corresponding number of agents. The decline in the maximal
value for n ¸ 12, together with the convergence result reported in Appendix A, suggest the conjecture
that 8:33% is the absolute upper bound on all pro¯les.
We turn to an evaluation of the surplus gain. We assume here that utility functions are quasi-linear:
given an increasing sequence of costs cq, c0 = 0 and cq < cq+1, interpreted as the cost of waiting q periods,
the utility function of agent i takes the form: ui(q) = ui ¡ cq for all i 2 I, and all q, 1 · q · n. (Thus
agent i is of type q if and only if cq < ui · cq+1.)
Denote by ®t
q the probability that date q is assigned, with t = 0 for RP and t = 1 for PS (so that
®0
q = ¯q and ®1














We now evaluate the surplus gain from RP to PS relative to the e±cient surplus Se, corresponding to
the assignment of the qe ¯rst periods to the qe agents of highest type (see eq. (5)). In Table 3 we report






£ 100 (in %) when we specify linearly
increasing costs cq = q, and assume that the willingness to wait of all agents of a given type q are evenly
spread in the interval ]cq;cq+1]. Naturally, we maintain the constraint Q · 8.




















Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Let Aq;r denote the set of sequences of the n agents such that, in the equilibrium of the corre-
sponding priority mechanism, exactly q ¡ r among the q ¯rst dates are assigned to agents in InMq+1,
and r or less to agents in Mq+1. Let aq;r denote the probability of Aq;r (namely ]Aq;r = n!aq;r). Then
22aQ;Q¡q is the probability that exactly q dates are eventually assigned. Clearly ¯q equals the probability
that at least q dates at least are assigned, so equation (6) follows.
Step 2: Three simple cases. We must prove that the probabilities aq;r are given by the recursive formulas
(7) and (8). Consider ¯rst the case r > q. Formula (7) gives (by induction) aq;r = 0, as desired.
Next consider (q;r) such that nq = 0. Then equation (7) reads: aq;r = aq¡1;r¡1. Indeed, all binomial
numbers in the formula are equal to 1 since the only value j can take is zero. On the other hand aq;r is
the proba that q ¡ r of the q ¯rst dates be assigned to agents of types 1 to q. Since there are no agent
of type q and since agents of types strictly smaller than q cannot consume the q-th date, the probability
of this event is the same as the probability that among the q ¡1 ¯rst dates, q ¡r[= (q ¡1) ¡(r ¡1)] be
assigned to agents of types 1 to q ¡ 1, i.e., aq¡1;r¡1 .
Third, consider (q;r) such that q ¸ r > mq+1 and prove equation (8). Set r = mq+1 + k · q, with
k ¸ 1, then aq;r is the probability that, after assignment of the q ¯rst dates, q ¡ mq+1 ¡ k be assigned
to agents of types 1 to q; but there are only mq+1 agents of types q + 1 to Q. Therefore (k ¸ 1) the
q-th date is not assigned. For such orderings, the last round, i.e., the assignment of a q-th date, can just
be cancelled: all agents who were going to accept it have already been proposed a earlier date, and are
served. Then aq;mq+1+k is just the proba that at the preceding round (q ¡ mq+1 ¡ k) ¡ nq dates have




Step 3: It remains to consider a pair (q;r) such that nq > 0 and r · minfq;mq+1g and prove equation
(7), giving aq;r as a function of aq¡1;: :
For all j such that 0 · j · minfnq;q¡rg, let Aq;r(j) be the subset of Aq;r such that exactly j dates

















aq;r(j) and fj > q ¡ r =) aq¡1;r¡1+j = 0g :
(The latter fact follows from q¡1 < r¡1+j and Step 2.) In order to establish (15), we note that Aq;r(j)
is a subset of Aq¡1;r¡1+j, and we compute the conditional probability of Aq;r(j) given Aq¡1;r¡1+j.
Consider a sequence in Aq¡1;r¡1+j. With respect to the assignment of the ¯rst q ¡ 1 dates, agents
in Mq are equivalent (from a probabilistic point of view): they all accept any date o®ered. To make the
¯nal argument intuitive, in the considered ordering, we put a bar on top of each agent who ends up being
served. Thus our ordering is in Aq¡1;r¡1+j if and only if, upon reading the ordering from left to right
up to the q-th bar, there are q ¡ r ¡ j bars under which one sees an agent in InMq. The key point is
23that this is independent of the relative ordering of agents in Mq under the remaining r+j (or less) bars.
Making this ordering precise, i.e., distinguishing agents in Iq from agents in Mq+1, is exactly what we
need to deduce aq;: from aq¡1;: .
Note that, for an ordering in Aq;r(j), there are (up to the q-th bar) exactly j bars under which is an
agent of Iq and exactly r bars under which is an agent of Mq+1 (the latter claim because r · mq+1).
To compute the desired conditional probability, we ¯x the q ¡ r ¡ j bars (up to the q-th bar) on top of
an agent in InMq, and we compute the probability that the remaining r +j bars are ¯lled with exactly
j agents in Iq and r agents in Mq+1. This goes ¯rst by choosing the j bars, out of those r + j, which





ways to do so. And then one has to ¯ll them
with agents of type q, and there are, for the ¯rst bar, nq such agents out of the mq of type q and more,
nq ¡ 1 choices out of mq ¡1 for the second, and so on, down until nq ¡j +1 choices out of mq ¡ j + 1
for the j-th bar; then one has to ¯ll the r other bars: mq+1 choices out of the mq ¡ j for the ¯rst one,
mq+1 ¡1 choices out of mq ¡j ¡1 for the second, and so on, down until mq+1 ¡r +1 choices out of the
mq ¡j ¡r + 1 for the last one. Hence the chances that the ordering has the required feature is:
nq ::: (nq ¡j +1) mq+1 ::: (mq+1 ¡ r +1)










This concludes the proof of equation (15), and of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We ¯x the pro¯le of types (I1;:::;IQ) and proceed ¯rst to prove Proposition 2 in the case Q · n: Steps
1, 2 and 3. The case Q > n is discussed in Step 4.
Step 1: Doubly stochastic cover of ZPS. Denote by N = I£f1;:::;ng the set of entries of an assignment
matrix. We denote the matrix ZPS as [p¤
ik] and de¯ne three subsets of N:
F = f(i;k) 2 N j p¤
ik > 0 and k · q¤ g
A1 = f(i;k) 2 N j k · q¤ and i = 2 Mk g
A2 = f(i;k) 2 N j k ¸ q¤ + 1 and i 2 Mq¤+1 g
Note that Ai may be empty, but that F is not. Figure 1 illustrates these 3 sets in the case of the six
agents pro¯le (2;1;0;1;2) by conveniently assigning agents to rows by increasing types (the agents in I1





then rectangular (on Figure 1 it occupies a top right corner of ZPS):
(i;k) 2 B () i 2 InMq¤+1 and q¤ + 1 · k · n :






























































pik ¸ 0 for all i;k ;
X
i2I
pik = 1 for all k ;
X
k2K
pik = 1 for all i :
First we take care of the case q¤ = n. Then B is empty, so we cannot alter ZPS, but the latter is
already doubly stochastic is this case. Indeed, q¤ = n implies Q = n (because q¤ · Q and we assume











for all k, gives mk = n for
all k, 1 · k · n = Q. This means that the pro¯le of types is Ik = ; for k < n and I = In, in which case
all entries of ZPS are 1=n.
Let us now assume q¤ < n, so that B is nonempty (if Mq¤+1 = I, then q¤ = n by de¯nition of q¤).
We distinguish two cases for de¯ning P on B.
Case 1 : Mq¤+1 = ; (namely q¤ = Q). We set for all q, 1 · q · q¤, for all i 2 Iq, all k, q¤ + 1 · k · n :
pik =
1 ¡ µq












ik = µq, hence
n X
1



















A = 1 ;
where the last two equations follow from the de¯nition of µq and mq¤+1 = 0.
Case 2 : Mq¤+1 6= ;. Here we choose di®erently the entries in column q¤+1 versus columns q¤+2;:::;n (if
any). Construct ¯rst the entries of column q¤+1: for all q, 1 · q · q¤, for all i 2 Iq: pi;q¤+1 = ¹(1¡µq) ¸ 0


















nq(1 ¡ µq) +² mq¤+1 = ¹(n ¡q
¤ ¡ ² mq¤+1) +² mq¤+1
(we omit the details of the straightforward computation). Observe that by de¯nition of q¤,
1
mq¤+1
+ µq¤ > 1 =) 1 > ² mq¤+1
therefore 0 < ¹ =
1 ¡ ² mq¤+1
n ¡ q¤ ¡ ² mq¤+1
· 1 and the de¯nition of the (q¤ + 1)-column is complete. Now we
de¯ne the columns q¤ + 2 to n. If q¤ +1 = n, there is nothing to do and indeed the matrix P is doubly
stochastic already, because ¹ = 1. Assume now n ¸ q¤ +2 and de¯ne:













pik = µq + ¹(1 ¡µq) + (1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡µq) = 1 :





n ¡ q¤ ¡ ² mq¤+1
and the veri¯cation that for all k,
q¤ +2 · k · n, the k column sums to 1 is now straightforward.
Step 3: Applying Birkho®'s theorem. A doubly stochastic matrix is the convex combination of permuta-
tion matrices, hence there is a probability distribution ¼ on S such that: P =
X
¾2S
¼¾P¾ . Note that the
P matrix is zero in A1 and in A2 (except for the q¤ +1 column); hence, for any permutation ¾ such that
¼¾ > 0, the matrix P¾ is also zero in these two subsets of N; in other words, we have:
for all k; 1 · k · q¤ : ¾(k) = i =) i 2 Mk
for all k; q¤ + 2 · k · n : ¾(k) = i =) i = 2 Mq¤+1
This implies at once that in the equilibrium assignment corresponding to the priority ordering ¾, the ¯rst
q¤ agents chose to buy and the last n¡q¤¡1 declined. In particular, ¾ = (i1;:::;iq¤) or (i1;:::;iq¤;iq¤+1).
Moreover P¾ = ¢(P¾) where ¢ is the (linear) operator cancelling the B-entries in a (given) matrix and






¼¾P¾ and the proof of
Proposition 2 is complete in the case Q · n.
Step 3: The case n < Q. Consider a pro¯le of types (I0;:::;IQ) with n < Q. Distinguish two cases. If
q¤ < n, then the new pro¯le (I0;:::;In¡1;Mn) (that is, the set of agents Mn in the initial pro¯le equals
the set of agents of type n in the new pro¯le) yields precisely the same PS assignment to every agent
(because the two pro¯les generate the same sets of agents of type 1 to q¤ +1). But in the second pro¯le,
26we can apply the above argument because the number of types is not larger that of agents, and we are
home.
If, on the other hand, q¤ = n, then an argument given in Step 2 shows that I1 = ::: = In¡1 = ;,
Mn = I and the matrix ZPS is uniform so the desired statement holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is very simple, as can be checked on a couple of examples, so we only sketch it. The proof is
identical for the RP and PS social choice functions, provided we set ®q to be the probability that the
q-th date be assigned, with ®q = ¯q or ®q = °q respectively. Let Ut, Tt and zt be as the premises of the
group strategyproof property and let q be the smallest type at which T0 and T1 di®er:
I0
k = I1





k for k = 0;:::;q , hence all agents in Mq have, in zt, the same probability
pik = ®k=mk of consuming date k. Moreover, if ®q+1 = 0 (which implies that ®k = 0 for all k ¸ q + 1)
then z0 = z1 and we are home. Thus we assume from now on ®q+1 > 0 . Distinguish two cases.
If there is an agent i in I1
knI0
k, this agent, in T0, is of type at least q + 1, hence in z0 he consumes






i(q + 1) > 0) and we are done.
If there is an agent i in I0
knI1
k, this agent, in T1, is of type at least q+1, hence in z0 he consumes date







i holds true if u0
i(q +1) is negative. The only possibility is thus u0
i(q + 1) = 0.
Clearly the above two cases exhaust all possibilities. They establish the desired property 11 except
perhaps in the case where, between z0 and z1, some agents report a type q1, larger than their true type
q0, and are indi®erent to the resulting change of assignment because their utility is zero for all dates
q between q0 + 1 and q1, that they consume with positive probability after misreporting. In turn, this
implies that everyone in the deviating coalition T is indi®erent between z0 and z1, which concludes the
proof. We omit the details.
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: Notation and preliminary remarks. We write ®t
q, 1 · q · Q, the probability that date q is
assigned by mechanism t, where t = 0 refers to RP and t = 1 refers to PS. Similarly, pt
q = ®t
q=mq denotes
the probability that an agent in Mq consumes date q, and ¼t
q is the probability that an agent of type q





q. We say the sequence (x1;:::;xT) of real numbers stochastically






yr ; for all t; 1 · t · T : (16)
27We shall use the following well-known fact (Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934)) : if (º1;:::;ºT) is a non-




ºr ¢ xr ¸
t X
r=1
ºr ¢yr ; for all t; 1 · t · T : (17)
Step 2: Proof of statement 1. This says that the sequence (p1
q) stochastically dominates the sequence
(p0
q), and follows at once from the following properties:
¯q · °q for all q ; 1 · q · q¤ ;
¼0
q · ¼1
q(= 1) for all q ; q¤ +1 · q · Q :
Step 3: Proof of statement 4. We already know that ®t
q = 1 for t = 0;1 and all q, , 1 · q · qe (see
discussion after De¯nition 3). This implies statement 4, as well as the ¯rst inequality in (12).
Step 4: Proof of statement 2. Statement 1 says ¼0
q · ¼1
q for all q ;1 · q · Q. The total expected number




q, hence q0 · q1, and the second inequality in (12)
is proven.












(q¤ ¡q + 1) : (18)
Assume ¯rst q¤ is odd, q¤ = 2q ¡ 1. Applying (18) to q yields q · mq, hence q · qe so that q¤ < 2qe
and q1 · q¤ + 1 · 2qe as desired. Next suppose q¤ is even, q¤ = 2q ¡ 2 and apply (18) to q. Note that
the left-hand inequality must be strict: an equality would imply q = 1 (by de¯nition of q¤) and q¤ = 0.
Therefore (18) implies:
q¤ ¡q +1 < mq () q · mq () q · qe =) q¤ +1 = 2q ¡1 < 2qe ;
and we are done.






k. By de¯nition of type q, we have ui(k) ¸ 0 for k = 1;:::;q, and by Step 2, the sequence
(p1
k) stochastically dominates (p0
k); this applies as well to their truncated versions where k runs from 1
to q. Hence the desired inequality ui ¢z0
i · ui ¢ z0
i (Step1).
Step 6: Proof of statement 5. Assume q¤ ¸ qe + 1. Consider an agent i of type ¹ q, ¹ q ¸ qe + 1. We





q = 1;:::;qe, we deduce ¼0
qe+1 < ¼1
qe+1. Now we complete the proof by invoking the following variant
28of the fact at the end of Step 1: if at least one of the inequalities (16) is strict and if the sequence º is
strictly decreasing, then inequality (16) is strict.
Step 7: Proof of the `tightness' result. Fix q and denote by ´ a large integer. Consider the pro¯le of
types: j Iq j= ´ ¢ q; j I2q j= q; all other Ik are empty. Check qe = q. Next, when ´ goes to in¯nity, the
probability that a random ordering of I starts by q agents in Iq goes to one. When this happens, the
number of agents served by RP is 2q. Therefore, the expected value qRP is arbitrarily close to 2q as ´
grows large.
Proof of Property 14
























= x 2 [0;1[. Inequality (19) ensures us
that there exists (n1;Q1) such that (n;Q) ¸ (n1;Q1) =)
mq(n;Q)
q(n;Q) > 1. Then q(n;Q) · q
(n;Q)
e . As a











= 1. Consider then the case





























¸ 1 and ±(xe) = 0, a
contradiction.) Moreover, if x < 1 then
nq(n;Q)
mq(n;Q)
¡! 0. (Indeed, limn!1 nq(n;Q) = ¡c±0(x) and














¡! 1. The result obtains.
29